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According to one prominent view in contemporary epistemology, the correct application of 
one’s cognitive abilities in believing truly is necessary and sufficient for a kind of credit that 
is, in turn, necessary for knowledge. Epistemologists who hold this view typically take the 
cognitive abilities concerned to be based in states and processes that are spatially located 
inside the head of the knowing subject. Enter the hypothesis of extended cognition 
(henceforth ExC). According to ExC, the physical machinery of mind sometimes extends 
beyond the skull and skin. The present chapter will explore what happens when the credit 
condition on knowledge is brought into contact with ExC. Via discussions of (a) empirical 
psychological work on the adaptive character of technologically augmented memory and (b) 
thought experiments from the extended cognition and extended knowledge literatures, 
conclusions will be drawn for our understanding of ‘knowledge in the wild’.  
1. An Unlikely Hero 
As described by Seneca the Younger in letter 27 of his Epistulae morales ad Lucilium (Moral 
Letters to Lucilius), Calvisius Sabinus was a fabulously wealthy Roman with a biological 
memory so poor that he would sometimes even forget the name of Ulysses, Achilles, or 
Priam. In response to this cognitive shortcoming, Sabinus bought several expensive slaves 
and had each of them trained to memorize epic or lyric poetry. They were then positioned at 
the end of his couch during dinner parties. Now and then, he would ask them for verses that 
he would endeavor to repeat, although Seneca the Younger, with barely concealed derision, 
reports that he would often fail. Calvisius Sabinus, this rich and empty-headed Roman, is the 
hero of our story. But that comes later.1 
2. Beyond Cognitive Internalism 
Our increasingly wired, wireless and technologically enhanced world presents us with many 
philosophical challenges. Here we shall be concerned with issues that arise regarding the 
notion of knowledge, or perhaps more accurately the state of knowing. Much of the 
discussion that follows focuses on propositional knowledge (knowing that p), although the 
issues that will exercise us are not unique to that form of knowledge. Our point of departure 
is that the structures with which we know things, and the processes by which we come to 
know things, are changing: we swipe and zoom on tablets to search up and display remotely 
accessed information; our ways of storing and retrieving personal information are augmented 
by mobile computing devices, such as contact-storing cell phones whose smart interfaces are 
able to protect us from the tedious business of recognizing or typing in the relevant numbers; 
new sensory substitution technologies are under development to enable, for example, deaf 
individuals to receive testimonial knowledge by “feeling” the words spoken by other 
individuals;2 and there is already commercially available wearable technology that monitors 
                                                
1 For critical discussion of the ideas presented here, many thanks to audiences in Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Nice, San Antonio, Stirling, and Warwick. Many thanks also to Adam Carter for his helpful 
comments on an earlier version of the chapter, and to Bill Short for introducing me to Calvisius 
Sabinus. For Short’s own discussion of memory slaves and the extended mind, see Short 
(Forthcoming). 
2 The deaf person wears a vest that vibrates to the degree that a particular frequency is present in 
ambient sound, the strategy being for her to associate specific vibration patterns with specific 
our electrical, chemical and postural well-being, and then feeds that information back to us 
via intuitive displays and prompts, enabling us to know our own brains and bodies better. 
You can add your own favorite example. Given that epistemology is the theory of knowledge, 
presumably part of its job is to tell us precisely what knowing amounts to, in our 
technologically saturated world. So, how should one conceptualize the epistemic contribution 
of the kinds of technology-involving loops just described? Let’s start our investigation by 
taking a position off the philosophical shelf.	
One popular approach in contemporary virtue epistemology is to think of knowledge as 
the product of cognitive abilities. I am going to assume this approach here. And I shall follow 
Greco (e.g., 2002) in holding that the intellectual virtues generally may be conceived as 
cognitive abilities that help us get to the truth and avoid error. One way of making the 
cognitive abilities approach concrete is found in what we might call the credit condition on 
knowledge. Here’s Greco (2007, 57): “knowledge attributions can be understood as credit 
attributions: when we say that someone knows something, we credit them for getting it right” 
(see also Riggs 2007; Sosa 2007). Put generically, and in terms of true belief, then, the credit 
condition may be stated as follows: knowing that p implies deserving credit for truly 
believing that p. In other words, knowledge results only when one deserves credit for 
believing the truth. So, when does one deserve such credit? A standard answer is that credit 
accrues when and only when one exercises one’s cognitive abilities in the right sort of way. 
Put all this together and we arrive at the following picture: the correct application of one’s 
cognitive abilities in believing truly, or in the process of coming to believe truly, is necessary 
and sufficient for a kind of credit that is, in turn, necessary for knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                  
spoken words. See http://www.eagleman.com/research/sensory-substitution (last accessed July 7, 
2016). For the detailed science, see Novich and Eagleman (2015). 
By and large, epistemologists who think that cognitive abilities perform this kind of 
fundamental epistemic role succumb immediately to a certain kind of internalist temptation. 
That is, they take the cognitive abilities concerned to be based in various states and processes 
that are spatially located inside the head of the knowing subject. To avoid confusion, we need 
to register the fact that this kind of internalism—which I shall henceforth call cognitive 
internalism—is not, and does not entail, the widely discussed (in the epistemology literature) 
form of internalism according to which, for a subject to know, the justification for the belief 
in question must be reflectively accessible to that subject. This latter kind of internalism—
sometimes called epistemic internalism—is rejected by most virtue epistemologists, in favor 
of the view that, routinely, reflection alone cannot settle whether a belief was produced by 
intellectual virtue. And this is a view that, expanding our taxonomy one step further, is 
sometimes called epistemic externalism. But epistemic externalism is entirely consistent with 
the claim that the cognitive abilities that constitute the intellectual virtues are based in various 
states and processes that are spatially located inside the head of the knowing subject—that is, 
epistemic externalism is entirely consistent with cognitive internalism.3 
Why is cognitive internalism so tempting? Because (so the argument goes, and with a 
nod to the orthodox view in cognitive science) that’s where we will find (the material 
realizers of) the psychological dispositions, information-processing operations, computational 
routines, and so on that account for those abilities. Thus Goldman (1979, 13) writes as 
follows: “A justified belief is, roughly speaking, one that results from cognitive operations 
that are, generally speaking, good or successful. But ‘cognitive’ operations are most plausibly 
construed as operations of the cognitive faculties, i.e., ‘information-processing’ equipment 
internal to the organism.” Of course, the successful exercise of a neurally based cognitive 
                                                
3 For a detailed discussion of different forms of internalism and externalism in relation to extended 
cognition and extended knowledge, see Carter et al. (2014). 
ability may depend on the presence of certain normal conditions in the organism’s 
environment, but such conditions are, we are told, not part of the psychological story proper. 
They are causal-enabling factors whose contribution is akin to that made by gravity when 
Gareth Bayle successfully exercises his ability to score from a thirty-yard, wall-avoiding, 
soccer free kick. 
Enter the hypothesis of the extended cognition (henceforth ExC).4 According to ExC, the 
physical machinery of mind sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin. More precisely, 
according to ExC, there are actual (in this world) cases of intelligent thought and action, in 
which the material vehicles that realize the thinking and thoughts concerned are spatially 
distributed over brain, body, and world, in such a way that certain external (beyond the skull 
and skin) factors are rightly accorded the same (i.e., cognitive) status as would ordinarily be 
accorded to a subset of your neurons. So, to be clear, “extension” here has the sense of spatial 
(environment-encompassing) extension, not performance enhancement, although, in some 
cases of extended cognition, psychological performance will indeed be enhanced. So, what 
sort of external physical machinery might succeed in extending the mind in this manner? 
Although it’s true that, from the point of view of the theory, even rather pedestrian examples 
of technological scaffolding such as notebooks, tally sticks, and abacuses would, under the 
right circumstances, do perfectly well in the mind-extending stakes (see below for a canonical 
                                                
4 Throughout this chapter, I will use the terms “mind” and “cognition” interchangeably. This 
strikes me as standard practice in cognitive science. From this perspective, “extended 
cognition” and “the extended mind” are alternative names for the same view. The case for 
extended cognition was first made by Clark and Chalmers (1998; see also Clark 2008). For 
a more recent collection, that places the original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a 
range of developments, criticisms, and defenses of the view, see Menary 2010. 
example of this pedestrian sort), there’s little doubt that ExC animates the contemporary 
study of mind partly because of the way it engages our hopes and fears regarding modern 
technology. Thus, the most eye-catching examples of external elements that advocates of 
ExC take to enjoy cognitive status are the kinds of technological props for thought that we 
canvassed earlier, artifacts such as smartphones, tablets, and certain items of wearable 
computing. 
For present purposes, I am not really concerned to defend ExC (for my own thoughts in 
that area, see e.g., Wheeler 2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2014). Rather, I want to explore some of 
ExC’s epistemological implications. The most obvious consequence of ExC is that it provides 
a way of resisting the cognitive internalist temptation highlighted earlier. Put another way, if 
ExC is true, then knowing is sometimes the product of cognitive abilities that are based in 
extended cognitive states and processes (e.g., Pritchard 2010; 2013). In yet other words, and 
completing the taxonomy that we began earlier, if ExC is true, then we should be cognitive 
externalists. That’s certainly a consequence of ExC, but one might seriously wonder whether 
it’s one that should keep the epistemologist qua epistemologist awake at night. After all, the 
transition from the mainstream internalism about the machinery of mind that is assumed by 
most epistemologists who pursue the cognitive abilities line to the machinery externalism 
recommended by advocates of ExC might leave everything else about the theory of 
knowledge entirely intact. For example, the correct application of one’s cognitive abilities in 
the process of coming to believe truly might still be necessary and sufficient for a kind of 
credit that is, in turn, necessary for knowledge. In what follows, I shall target this specific 
issue, by asking: what happens when ExC is brought into contact with the credit condition on 
knowledge? I am certainly not the first person to explore, in some way, this particular 
meeting of views (see e.g., Preston 2010; Vaesen 2011; 2013; Adams 2012; Aizawa, 2012; 
Menary 2012; Kelp 2013, 2014; Palermos 2016), but, as I shall argue, certain prominent 
previous treatments of the issue have failed to draw the right conclusions, so further analysis 
is warranted. Moreover, my ultimate goal in reflecting on this issue is not to assess the credit 
condition on knowledge as such, but rather to nudge us into a better place from which to 
understand what we might, half-echoing Hutchins (1995), call knowledge in the wild. Before 
all that, however, we need to get some conceptual bearings. 
3. Knowing the Facts 
Consider the following experiments performed by Sparrow et al. (2011). In the first 
experiment, participants were instructed to type, into a computer, forty trivia statements that 
might ordinarily be found online (e.g., “An ostrich’s eye is bigger than its brain”). Half the 
participants were told that their typed statements would be saved on the computer and half 
were told that their typed statements would be deleted. Within each of these groups, half of 
the individuals concerned were asked explicitly to try to remember the statements, where – 
and this is crucial—“remember” signals “store in your brains.” All the participants were then 
asked to write down as many of the statements as they could remember. Interestingly, the fact 
of whether or not a participant was asked to remember the target statements had no 
significant effect on later recall, but the steer about whether or not the statements would be 
saved on the computer did, with superior recall demonstrated by those participants who 
believed that their typed statements had been deleted. In other words, where the expectation 
is that information will be readily available via technology, people tend not to store that 
information internally. A further study provided participants in the saved condition with 
additional information indicating where on the computer the saved statements were being 
stored (e.g., folder names). This scenario uncovered a more complex profile of organic 
memory allocation, suggesting that people don’t internally store where to find externally 
stored items of information when they have internally stored the items themselves, but that 
they do internally store where to find externally stored items of information when they have 
not internally stored the items themselves. 
Sparrow et al. pitch their experiments as investigations into the adaptive character of 
memory, concluding that “when people expect information to remain continuously available 
(such as we expect with Internet access), we are more likely to remember [i.e., commit to 
organic memory] where to find it than we are to remember [commit to organic memory] the 
details of the item” (Sparrow et al. 2011, 3).5 Intuitively, there is a close connection between 
memory and knowledge, in at least the sense that most of what we can be said to know is 
plausibly stored in memory, and perhaps in stronger senses too (e.g., some theorists hold that 
to remember that p entails knowing that p; for critical discussion, see Bernecker 2010). And 
where memory-related knowledge is the issue, the cognitive operations that matter will be 
those concerned with the preservation and maintenance of true beliefs, rather than with the 
formation of such beliefs. Any such operations must at least partly be realized in the 
cognitive machinery that stores information over time. 
Given this pattern of connections between memory and stored knowledge, let’s see how 
the epistemology looks in the wake of Sparrow et al.’s experiments. Imagine that an 
individual who has been told how to access certain facts using some readily available 
technology, and who has committed this access information, but not the facts themselves, to 
organic memory, is in a pre-display period, that is, a period of time before the relevant 
information has been retrieved and displayed using the technology. The pre-display 
restriction quarantines any complications that might arise in characterizing the period of time 
during which, and presumably shortly after which, the individual in question is actually, say, 
looking at the facts displayed on a screen. Such displayed facts may well be temporarily 
                                                
5 Perhaps this is such an obvious feature of our modern experience that no experimental evidence was 
really required to substantiate it, but it’s always comforting to get the data. 
stored in the individual’s brain, even though the widespread failure of human beings to store 
information that they believe to be readily accessible using technology means (we can 
assume) that these facts will not be committed to long-term organic memory. Working with 
this picture, as Sparrow et al.’s results suggest we should, there may well be many pre-
display periods during which the facts in question are not neurally stored, with those periods 
stationed between multiple retrieval events in which no relevant changes to long-term organic 
memory are made. Now we can ask the following question: in such a pre-display period, does 
the individual we have been considering know the relevant facts or merely how to find those 
facts using the available technology?6 Before you all rush to vote, let’s bring the issue into 
better view, via a distinction that is at the heart of the contemporary debate over the extended 
mind. 
The distinction that concerns us is between embedded cognition and extended cognition. 
As we have seen already, according to ExC, the physical machinery of mind (the region of 
the material world where, on any particular occasion, psychological states and processes are 
instantiated) sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin. By contrast, according to the 
embedded view, although the distinctive adaptive richness and/or flexibility of intelligent 
thought and action is regularly, and perhaps sometimes necessarily, causally dependent on the 
bodily exploitation of certain environmental (e.g., technological) props and scaffolds, the 
actual thinking going on in such cases remains an internal, paradigmatically neural, 
phenomenon. In other words, the embedded theorist believes that proper justice can be done 
to the important, and sometimes necessary, causal contributions made by environmental 
elements to many cognitive outcomes without there being any pressure to attribute cognitive 
status to the beyond-the-skin factors involved. Adopting some terminology introduced into 
                                                
6 A version of this question is also asked, in relation to extended cognition, by Preston (2010) and 
Carter and Kallestrup (2016). 
the extended mind debate by Adams and Aizawa (e.g., 2008), the distinction between 
embedded and extended cognition might be put as follows: for the fan of embedded 
cognition, thought is “merely” causally dependent on external factors whereas, for the 
advocate of extended cognition, thought is constitutively dependent on those factors (leaving 
open the possibility that the constitutive relations that matter may well be a delineable subset 
of the causal relations in play). 
Now let’s ask our question again: given an individual who has committed the relevant 
access information for certain facts, but not the facts themselves, to organic memory, and 
given that we are in a period of time before the relevant information has been retrieved and 
displayed using the available technology, does that individual know those facts or merely how 
to find them using the technology? First assume that what we confront here is a case of 
extended cognition, and that what that means is that the technology where, pre-display, the 
relevant information is stored is itself part of the physical machinery of mind, such that the 
individual’s relevant cognitive states and processes are partly realized, constitutively 
speaking, in the technology. In this scenario, the answer to our question must surely be that 
the individual knows the facts, not merely how to find them. After all, if this is a case of the 
extended mind as just described, the salient information is stored in machinery that is literally 
part of her cognitive machinery. In this case, memory, as a cognitive ability, would be based 
in cognitive operations that encompass, as constitutive parts, neural mechanisms (e.g., for 
triggering context-sensitive retrieval), bodily movements (opening the right apps, clicking on 
the right folders and files) and the external technology where the relevant information is 
stored. As one might put it, the individual knows the facts, and not merely how to find them, 
because the information-bearing states and processes that provide the content for the true 
beliefs in question are inside her cognitive system, even though they are not inside her brain. 
Now let’s assume that what we confront in our pre-display scenario is a case of 
embedded cognition, and that what that means is that although the individual concerned has 
not stored the relevant facts in her brain, nevertheless she has the capacity, in part because 
she has internally stored the access information, to subtly couple with the available 
technology in such a way that she is able, fluidly and reliably, to access those facts in real 
time. On the embedded interpretation, the only constitutively cognitive machinery present 
here is in the individual’s brain, so the external technology where the facts are stored is 
beyond the limits of the individual’s cognitive architecture. Under these circumstances, the 
right answer to our question is presumably that our individual does not know the facts, only 
how to find them using the available technology. After all, if this is a case of the embedded 
mind as just described, the salient information is stored in machinery that is not part of her 
cognitive machinery. In this case, we still observe a process in which neural mechanisms, 
bodily movements, and external technology combine as partners to retrieve information. But 
only the first partner, the brain, makes a cognitive contribution. So we cannot reasonably 
characterize the individual as truly believing the relevant facts. Her cognitive abilities are not 
a matter of maintaining true beliefs regarding those facts, but rather of sustaining her capacity 
to seek out those facts, and thus to endorse them, even if only temporarily, under appropriate 
conditions. 
In the preceding analysis, I have not taken sides as to which interpretation, the embedded 
one or the extended one, is correct. All I have claimed is that our epistemological question 
demands different answers depending on which one of these interpretations we adopt. 
Nevertheless, one defensive comment regarding the extended interpretation is warranted. It 
won’t do to object to that interpretation by complaining that our extended individual is not 
conscious of the information in question before it appears on the computer screen. At any one 
time, any one of us is standardly counted as knowing many facts that are not, at that moment, 
present within our conscious experience. These items of knowledge will be based on 
dispositional beliefs, beliefs that are not (at this moment) present to consciousness, but which 
are poised to be brought to consciousness under appropriate conditions. On the orthodox 
cognitive internalist story, the information that forms the content of such beliefs is stored 
unconsciously in our brains, ready to be brought to consciousness. So, in the purely internal 
case, the unconscious status of the relevant information prior to the event of retrieval does 
not, on its own, undermine the claim that one knows the facts in question. But if that’s right, 
then surely the unconscious status of the relevant information prior to the event of retrieval in 
the technology-involving case cannot, on its own, undermine the extended interpretation. 
Despite my refusal so far to take sides between the embedded and the extended 
interpretations, one might be moved to complain that it would be bizarre to think of the 
individual in our Sparrow et al.-style scenario as the bearer of an extended mind, because the 
external technology is inadequately incorporated into her ongoing psychological activity. For 
example, to deploy something like Clark’s (2008) “trust and glue” indicators of cognitive 
status (also operative in our next example below), although the information saved in the 
technological resource is, in the experimental context anyway, readily available and easily 
accessible, it is perhaps doubtful that it would be judged as trustworthy as information 
retrieved from organic memory, and so might well be subject to degrees of critical scrutiny 
that make the storage technology itself a poor candidate for being part of the individual’s own 
psychological memory system. In truth, although this may be a compelling point in the case 
of the participants in Sparrow et al.’s actual experiments, whose access to the technology is 
confined to the experimental context, it may be less persuasive if one considers (as we did 
earlier) an “in the wild” individual engaged in multiple successful retrieval events whose 
reliance on, and trust in, the technology might be predicted to increase over time. 
Nevertheless, if we are to treat the embedded and extended interpretations as genuine 
competitors, and thus if we are to take seriously the claim that, in some cases where memory 
is technologically scaffolded, we know the facts over time, even though the relevant 
information is not stored in our brains, perhaps a different candidate case of cognitive 
extension, one that plausibly meets reasonable incorporation conditions, is needed. Time, 
then, to reconnect with a pair of (for those of us who have been around this literature for a 
while) old friends who were first introduced to us by Clark and Chalmers (1998). It’s Otto 
and Inga time (again). 
Inga is a psychologically normal individual who has committed to her organic memory 
the address of the New York Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). If she forms the desire to go 
to MoMA, she accesses her organic memory to retrieve the information that the building is on 
53rd St. Otto, on the other hand, suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s which means that 
he cannot internally retain certain kinds of factual information. He compensates for this 
shortcoming by recording salient facts in a notebook that he carries with him constantly. If 
Otto forms the desire to go to MoMA, he automatically and unhesitatingly pulls out the 
notebook and, without a hint of any critical scrutiny of the information stored within, 
retrieves the relevant fact, viz. that the museum is on 53rd St. At this point in the drama, the 
so-called parity principle (Clark and Chalmers 1998) makes its entrance. The parity principle 
asks us to start by considering a distributed system like Otto and his notebook, that is, a 
system (a) that generates some psychologically interesting outcome and (b) whose operation 
involves not only neural clankings and whirrings, but also an important functional 
contribution from certain externally located physical elements. It then encourages us to 
imagine a hypothetical scenario in which the functional contribution identified in (b), to an 
equivalent outcome to the one identified in (a), is made not by any external elements, but by 
certain internally located factors. Having taken this imaginative step, if we then judge that the 
internal realizing elements in the latter hypothetical case count as bona fide parts of a 
genuinely cognitive system, we ought to conclude that the very same status—that is, 
cognitive status—should be granted to the external realizing elements in the environment-
involving case with which we began. To do otherwise would be to succumb to neural 
chauvinism, which is to beg the question against ExC. The idea is that, if we follow the steps 
just specified in order to implement the parity principle, we should conclude that Otto’s 
memory is extended into the environment. Moreover, argue Clark and Chalmers, just as, prior 
to recalling the information in question, Inga has the dispositional belief that MoMA is on 
53rd St., so too does Otto, although while Inga’s dispositional belief is realized in her head, 
Otto’s is realized in the extended, notebook-including system. 
If Otto has an extended memory and an extended dispositional belief, then we can 
exploit the same considerations we used in the Sparrow et al.-style case to reach the 
following conclusion: in the situation essentially equivalent to the pre-display case from 
earlier, that is, at a time before organic Otto looks in his notebook, extended Otto (organic-
Otto-plus-notebook) knows where MoMA is. Otto’s memory, as a cognitive ability, is based 
in cognitive operations that encompass, as constitutive parts, neural mechanisms (e.g., for 
triggering context-sensitive retrieval), bodily movements (e.g., for finding the right location 
in the notebook), and of course the notebook itself where the relevant information is stored. 
As one might put it, Otto knows the facts, and not merely how to find them, because the 
information-bearing states that provide the content for his true dispositional belief that 
MoMA is on 53rd St. are inside his cognitive system, even though they are not inside his 
brain. Of course, if the combination of the “trust and glue” indicators and the parity principle 
fails to establish that Otto has an extended memory and an extended dispositional belief, then 
Otto may provide nothing more than an instance of embedded cognition, in which case, 
exploiting the same reasoning as earlier, he will have no memory of the fact that MoMA is on 
53rd St., no dispositional belief to that effect, and so no knowledge of that fact. In this case, 
and before looking in his notebook, Otto doesn’t know that fact, but rather how to find it 
using the available technology. In other words, once again, how we categorize the cognitive 
system, as extended or as embedded, has consequences for the epistemic state of the target 
agent. This result is interesting in itself, but it will also be important as we turn our attention 
now back to our focal issue—the point of contact between ExC and the credit condition on 
knowledge. 
4. Credit Checks 
Let’s take stock. As we have seen, according to the credit condition on knowledge, knowing 
that p implies deserving credit for truly believing that p. If we unpack the notion of credit in 
terms of cognitive abilities, then this becomes the claim that the correct application of one’s 
cognitive abilities in believing truly, or in the process of coming to believe truly, is necessary 
and sufficient for a kind of credit. Such credit is, in turn, is necessary for knowledge. The 
cognitive abilities we care about here will be based in various psychological states and 
processes that will themselves be realized by some spatially locatable physical machinery. At 
that point, we have a choice between (i) a neuro-centric cognitive internalism—perhaps in its 
interactionist-embedded form—about that mental machinery or (ii) an ExC-style cognitive 
externalism. Which selection one makes here produces different answers to a question that 
we might ask about an individual who has ready access, via some available technology, to 
some facts of interest, but who has not stored those facts in her organic brain. That question 
is: does that individual (a) know those facts or (b) merely how to find them using the 
technology? The advocate of ExC, will, if certain criteria (e.g., those for “trust and glue” style 
incorporation) are met, plump for (a). The embedded cognitive internalist will plump for (b). 
So far, however, I have not identified any connections between this final point and the issue 
of credit. 
So how does the credit condition play out for cases of extended cognition? First, let’s focus 
on an example that appears in a treatment by Aizawa (this volume) of the relation between 
ExC and knowledge. Otis is an organic chemistry student whose lifestyle choices always lead 
him to miss his classes. When an exam looms, Otis copies from his textbook to make a set of 
little note cards. He smuggles these in to the exam and secretly consults them to answer the 
questions. He gets an “A,” but his tutor, who knows that he has missed all his organic 
chemistry classes, challenges him to explain how this was possible and threatens to fail him. 
In response, Otis honestly explains his strategy. The tutor accuses him of cheating. But here’s 
the thing: one class that Otis didn’t cut was the philosophy class in which what was studied 
was the canonical Clark and Chalmers paper on the extended mind mentioned earlier. Otis 
draws on this paper in his defense. His chief argument is that the set of cards forms a resource 
that is readily accessible as and when required, reliably and typically consulted, and that the 
information contained therein is automatically endorsed and not subject to critical scrutiny. In 
other words, the arrangement meets plausible “trust and glue” criteria. So, claims Otis, he 
(extended Otis) dispositionally believed all those true facts prior to taking the test. Indeed, he 
concludes triumphantly, he knew all that material, and he really should keep his “A.” Otis’s 
tutor is not moved. After a further exchange during which Otis implores her to focus on the 
larger Otis-plus-notebook system, Aizawa puts the following words into her mouth: “Yes, 
your overall performance using your notebook got an ‘A’, but your overall performance did 
not involve the cognitive capacities that were the whole point of the test. That’s why you fail. 
End of story” (Aizawa, this volume).7 
                                                
7 In Aizawa’s own description of the case, Otis also appeals to what, at first sight, looks like the parity 
principle, only to have that appeal rejected by his tutor. I have ignored this exchange in the debate, 
because, in truth, the argument that Aizawa has Otis produce deploys not the actual parity principle, 
as formulated by Clark and Chalmers, but rather a common misinterpretation of it. In particular, Otis 
Aizawa clearly agrees with the tutor’s assessment. Otis does not know the relevant facts: 
he knows only how to access them in a fluid and adaptive manner, using the available 
technology. More specifically, according to Aizawa, Otis meets the trust and glue criteria, but 
does not possess the relevant knowledge, meaning that the combination of trust and glue is 
not sufficient for knowledge. Now notice that Aizawa’s grounds for his conclusions are that 
Otis’s “overall performance did not involve the cognitive capacities that were the whole point 
of the test.” What Aizawa refers to as “cognitive capacities” here are equivalent to “cognitive 
abilities that are based in various cognitive operations.” In other words, in using the cognitive 
abilities that he possesses for creating and surreptitiously accessing a canny piece of external 
information storage, Otis has failed to use the correct cognitive abilities, the ones that were 
the subject of the test. The correct cognitive abilities were those that would have supported 
the committing of the relevant material to organic memory and the retrieval and the 
deployment of that material in such a way that evidence was provided of understanding. 
Thus, although Aizawa doesn’t put it this way, whatever credit Otis deserves, it is the wrong 
sort of credit for him to be attributed with knowledge of organic chemistry. That’s why he 
fails the test, because he fails to meet the credit condition on knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                  
appeals to a functional equivalence between Otis’s notebook and the neural resources of Opie, a 
fellow student who stored the organic chemistry information in his brain. That claim of functional 
equivalence is challenged by the tutor. Whoever is right here, the fact remains that, as illustrated 
earlier, the parity that matters for the actual parity principle obtains not between the Otis-notebook 
architecture and some extant wholly inner system such as, by hypothesis, Opie’s brain, but between 
the Otis-notebook architecture and a hypothetical wholly inner system constructed so as to be 
functionally equivalent to that architecture. For my own discussion of this sort of issue in a more 
general ExC context, see, e.g., Wheeler 2011a. One might wonder how Otis would have fared if he 
had appealed to the actual parity principle. Given his tutor’s staunchly internalist proclivities, it is 
highly unlikely that he would have come out on top.      
Aizawa intends this result to cast doubt on the idea that the combination of trust and glue 
is sufficient for extended cognition, presumably because the cognitive-ability-targeting style 
of argument that undermines the relevant knowledge attribution also undermines the claim 
that Otis has the related true dispositional beliefs. As it happens, there is, I think, scope to 
object that Otis does not in fact meet a plausible rendering of the trust and glue criteria, 
because there is no historical incorporation of the external resource into Otis’s ongoing 
cognitive activity. In that respect, Otis is less like Otto and more like one of the participants 
in the saved condition in the second of Sparrow et al.’s experiments as described earlier. 
Indeed, if there were to be a sustained historical pattern of repeated access to the card storage 
system, such that the resource did become a fully incorporated part of Otis’s ordinary 
psychological behavior, someone with philosophical inclinations in the direction of ExC 
might well be inspired to appear on Otis’s behalf, if his case went to appeal. In other words, 
and building on a line of argument introduced earlier, if Otis-plus-card-storage-system really 
is a case of cognitive extension, as opposed to cognitive embeddedness, then, before he enters 
the examination hall, extended Otis has a bunch of dispositional beliefs about organic 
chemistry, with the information that provides the content of those beliefs stored in a resource 
that is part of Otis’s cognitive architecture, even though it is not inside his brain. And that 
means that extended Otis has used the correct cognitive abilities, viz., those that support 
committing the relevant material to memory and retrieving and deploying that material in 
such a way that evidence is provided of understanding, which in turn means that extended 
Otis deserves credit for believing as he does. Anyone for an appeal?8 
                                                
8 A cognitive internalist critic might complain that extended Otis displays only a truncated retrieval 
ability, one that does not display genuine understanding of the material, which means that he 
should still fail the test. There are, I think, murky educational waters hereabouts, but in any case I 
am assuming that answering the test questions correctly, that is, getting the behavior right, will 
Even though Aizawa’s example is, in my assessment, ultimately inconclusive, both 
Aizawa’s conclusion as I have glossed it (that Otis doesn’t accrue the right sort of credit, and 
so doesn’t possess the relevant knowledge), and my own suggestion (that extended Otis does 
accrue the right sort of credit, and so does possess the relevant knowledge), assume the credit 
condition on knowledge. However, in the literature that has grown up at the intersection of 
epistemology and ExC, Vaesen (2011) has also argued, that if ExC is true, then the credit 
condition on knowledge is false. More specifically, Vaesen’s claim is that, in cases of 
technologically extended cognition, one can have knowledge without deserving credit for 
truly believing as one does, that is, without the correct application of one’s cognitive 
abilities.9 
Vaesen’s intuition-pumping thought experiment (which I am simplifying slightly to 
avoid raising issues that need not concern us here) concerns Sissi, an airport baggage 
inspector operating an x-ray scanner at security. One of the problems of this job is its tedious 
and demanding nature, which means that inspectors quickly get bored and their vigilance 
becomes seriously impaired. To combat this drop in attentiveness, and the accompanying risk 
of a disastrous failure to spot, say, a weapon, the scanners have recently been fitted with new 
                                                                                                                                                  
require some degree of understanding, and it surely wouldn’t undermine the extended interpretation 
if the principal source of that understanding were to be traced to Otis’s brain, however it managed 
to get in there, given his class-cutting lifestyle. ExC requires “only” that the physical machinery of 
mind is sometimes spread out over world, body and brain. For further philosophical reflection on 
the ways in which the adoption of an extended cognition perspective would have implications for 
how we educate and test, see, e.g., Pritchard 2013; Wheeler 2011b. In an educational system 
shaped by ExC, testing is likely to look rather different, which might well be good news for Otis. 
9 It is worth noting that the credit condition has also come under critical pressure in the mainstream 
epistemology literature. See, most prominently, Lackey’s visitor case (Lackey 2009). 
technology that occasionally produces false positives (images on the screen that make it seem 
as if there’s something untoward in the baggage, when there isn’t). Baggage inspectors click 
on the scanner image to find out whether it’s a false positive. This technology keeps them 
focused and alert. Now, Sissi is a baggage inspector whose career straddles both types of 
scanner, that is, those that existed both before and after the introduction of the false-positive-
generation technology. She understands the general operating principles of both types of 
scanner. We can assume that her neurally located cognitive abilities are constant across this 
changeover, in the sense that although her vigilance level is modulated by the new 
technology, no new cognitive abilities have been installed in her brain either during or since 
the changeover. On a particular day, Sissi inspects a bag that really does contain a gun. 
Thanks to the new technology, her vigilance level is high, so she forms a true belief regarding 
the contents of the suitcase, and a disaster is averted. 
Vaesen takes this to be a kind of technologically extended cognition, in that the true 
belief results from the operation of a causally coupled Sissi-technology system (more on this 
later). Two questions are now pertinent. The first is this: does Sissi know that there’s a gun in 
the bag? Vaesen answers “yes,” in part because we ordinarily allow knowledge, and not just 
true belief, to arise from technologically mediated cognition (e.g., in science). The second 
question is this: does Sissi deserve credit for having the true belief that there’s a gun in the 
bag? Vaesen answers “no,” arguing that the credit lies elsewhere, with the new technology 
itself or with whoever made the decision to install it. After all, Sissi’s cognitive abilities are 
constant, so (one might think), if this had been a day prior to the introduction of the new 
technology, she most likely would not have spotted the gun. Vaesen’s conclusion, then, is 
that Sissi has knowledge without credit, and thus that in cases of technologically extended 
cognition, it is possible for one to have knowledge without deserving credit for truly 
believing as one does. 
Given our interests here, the most important element in Vaesen’s Sissi-case argument is 
the understanding of extended cognition that he adopts. Here is what he says: 
[W]hatever we decide the mark of the cognitive to be, [the extended cognition 
view] contains a fairly uncontroversial (but in epistemology manifestly 
underplayed) part: the fact that human cognition is strongly dependent on 
external resources (whether or not we call them cognitive). Some features of 
the world actively scaffold us in our cognitive endeavors and as such are 
causally relevant to the kinds of beliefs we happen to have. And as long as 
[those who endorse the credit condition on knowledge] recognize this, my 
argument will appear effective. The ultralight version of [the extended 
cognition view] I will exploit, thus, is supposed to be attractive to a wide 
audience and sidesteps the conceptual morass surrounding the notion 
“cognitive.” (Vaesen 2011, 521) 
Vaesen’s “ultralight version” of extended cognition tends to obscure (what I have argued is) a 
clear and important distinction between embedded and genuinely extended cognition.10 Put 
another way, Vaesen rides roughshod over the causal-constitutive distinction. For Vaesen, the 
condition that is commonly taken to establish embedded, but not extended, cognition (namely 
the “mere” causal dependence, however subtle, of cognitive outcomes on external 
technology) is sufficient for extended cognition, in its “ultralight” form. Vaesen is clear that, 
if we treat the false-positive technology as a constitutive part of Sissi’s cognitive architecture, 
such that, in the appropriate sense, it enjoys cognitive status along with her brain, then the 
                                                
10 Points in this vicinity are also made by Adams (2012), Aizawa (2012), Menary (2012), and 
Palermos (2016), although none of these authors proceeds to draw out precisely the lessons that I 
do here. 
credit condition on knowledge would not be undermined. He writes (Vaesen 2011, 526) that 
if we “consider the processes going on in the machinery as genuinely cognitive, as belonging 
to ‘Sissi the extended cognitive agent’,” then “Sissi’s (now extended) faculties remain the 
most salient feature explaining her true belief, and [the credit condition] is saved.” After all, 
extended Sissi (organic-Sissi-plus-false-positive-technology) has, and uses correctly, 
cognitive abilities that organic Sissi doesn’t have. So extended Sissi not only counts as 
knowing about the weapon, she does so on good credit condition grounds, because her true 
belief is an achievement of her extended cognitive system that includes the relevant skin-
external technology, that is, it is the result of her correctly using her cognitive abilities, where 
those abilities are understood to be based in a suite of cognitive operations, some of which 
take place beyond her skin. So Vaesen’s argument actually leaves us with a choice (cf. 
Vaesen 2011, 526): either adopt ExC as I characterized it earlier in this chapter (that is, as a 
view which embraces constitutive dependence), in which case the credit condition on 
knowledge may be maintained, or adopt his ultralight version of extended cognition, in which 
case (if there are no other good objections to the Sissi example) the credit condition should be 
abandoned. 
Once Vaesen’s conclusion is not only put in terms of a choice, but positioned correctly in 
relation to the distinction between embedded and extended cognition, then, even if it is true, it 
has no direct implications for the relationship between ExC and the credit condition on 
knowledge. If the Sissi example can be given a full-strength extended interpretation (see 
earlier comments on “trust and glue,” parity etc.), then we confront a case of knowledge with 
credit, while if the Sissi example cannot be given a full-strength extended interpretation, then 
we should conclude at most that, in cases of technologically embedded cognition, one can 
have knowledge without credit. So far, so good. But what about the prospect of an indirect 
threat? After all, the credit condition is proposed as a necessary condition on knowledge, and 
if the strict necessity claim is no longer sustainable, because of the result in the embedded 
Sissi case, one might wonder if the advocate of ExC, along with everyone else, should look 
elsewhere for an account of knowledge, rather than treat all cases of embedded cognition (of 
which there are surely a very large number) as exceptions to the general rule. 
I suspect that the “strictly necessary” aspect of the credit condition may ultimately need 
to be relaxed, but that we ought to be able to develop a contextually sensitive account of 
when credit is needed for knowledge that manages to contain the threat posed by Sissi. To 
glimpse how this might be done, consider a situation in which an individual forms a true 
belief by using her smartphone in real time to access a known-to-be-reliable source of 
information on the Web, and in which the information thereby retrieved is transferred into a 
neurally encoded form in her brain. In relation to belief-formation, this case, which I am 
assuming is an instance of embedded cognition, seems to satisfy the credit condition on 
knowledge. After all, albeit in interaction with smart technology, the individual in question 
deploys various cognitive abilities—both perceptual and intellectual—in an appropriate 
manner to form her true belief, and so accumulates credit for having that belief. Indeed, if the 
remotely accessed resource is socially maintained on the Web, one might think of this as a 
relatively straightforward form of technologically mediated testimonial knowledge. So what 
is the difference between this mundane example of technologically scaffolded knowledge and 
Sissi, such that the former, but not the latter, meets the credit condition? The answer, I 
propose, is in the artificial details of the Sissi thought experiment. First, there is the crucial 
feature that, prior to the introduction of the technology, Sissi’s correct use of her cognitive 
abilities would most likely have failed to produce a true belief. Second, there is the 
stipulation that Sissi’s neurally based cognitive abilities do not change following the 
introduction of that technology. There is no reason to think that the mundane kind of 
technologically embedded cognition that I just described must share these characteristics. 
Indeed, the smartphone may simply speed up information access that could conceivably have 
been achieved using a very similar set of cognitive abilities (such as those for opening and 
reading a book), and real cases of embedded cognition frequently involve neural resources 
adapting themselves to exploit the available environmental scaffolding. However, where the 
artificial features just identified are absent, the credit condition on knowledge is not 
obviously placed at risk, so even if Vaesen is correct that Sissi provides an example of 
knowledge without credit, it begins to look as if the range of cases affected will be atypical of 
knowledge in the wild. 
5. Ownership and Credit 
In effect, I have been suggesting that there is a positive connection between a cognitive 
resource being located within a particular cognitive system and the accumulation of epistemic 
credit for true beliefs that are formed or maintained through the correct use of that resource. It 
might seem uncontroversial that some sort of relation of this sort must obtain here, but some 
articulation of what does the work is warranted. Indeed, just such an articulation is, I think, 
the missing piece of the conceptual jigsaw, and it is with this issue that I shall finish. 
As far as I can tell, the concept that we need, in order to make the transition from 
cognitive status to epistemic credit, is that of ownership. This is something that Calvisius 
Sabinus (remember him) appreciated. Recall that Sabinus compensated for his own poor 
organic memory by assembling a team of slaves who committed, to their own neurally 
located memory systems, poetry that they would recite on Sabinus’s demand at dinner 
parties. But here is something that I neglected to mention previously. As reported by Seneca 
the Younger, Sabinus believed that if any of his slaves knew something, then he himself also 
knew it. As soon as we ask ourselves how Sabinus could possibly have believed this 
seemingly outrageous principle, the answer seems blindingly obvious: because he owned the 
slaves (and thus their cognitive abilities), and because ownership is necessary and sufficient 
for epistemic credit. 
There’s undoubtedly something suspicious here, but, if I am right, the unreasonableness 
of Sabinus’s annexing of his slaves’ knowledge is not to be traced to his belief that ownership 
is necessary and sufficient for credit. That’s what Sabinus got right, and in that sense 
heroically hands us the final missing piece of the jigsaw. Where Sabinus went wrong was that 
he simply didn’t understand what sort of ownership is required. So if owning, in the 
appropriate sense, some correctly used cognitive resource is necessary and sufficient for 
epistemic credit, and if the appropriate sense of ownership isn’t property ownership, what 
exactly is it? The account that I’m inclined to give is essentially a deflationary (one might 
even say reductive) one, which, it seems to me, is a particularly attractive strategy where 
nebulous and ill-understood notions such as “the self” (which might be advanced as “doing” 
the owning) are lining up to make nuisances of themselves. I propose, then, that ownership 
here is a matter of the right kind of functional integration—nothing more, nothing less.11 
                                                
11 There are two senses in which the account of ownership I shall offer is essentially a deflationary 
account. First, in relation to the epistemology literature, it does not develop the pivotal notion of 
integration in terms of complex, personal-level notions such as cognitive character and cognitive 
agency, or even in terms of less demanding ideas such as appropriate (knowledge-conducive) 
sensitivity between innate faculties (see Palermos 2014 for a version of the former, and Carter and 
Pritchard (Forthcoming), for the latter, deployed in the vicinity of ExC). Second, in relation to 
(what I take to be) the most developed account of ownership in the extended mind literature, 
namely that of Rowlands (2010), my account does not appeal to any sort of robust or undischarged 
notion of the self. It is also worth mentioning that, unlike Rowlands’ approach, it does not assume 
that ownership is necessary for a resource to be cognitive at all, only that ownership is necessary 
for a cognitive resource to be someone’s cognitive resource. 
For a suggestion in this vein, consider Rupert’s (2013) claim that “the self is the 
cognitive architecture, and it owns a state just in case that state is a state of one of the 
architecture’s component mechanisms.” According to Rupert, our theorizing about the mind 
ought to track a distinction, prevalent in the empirical models produced by cognitive 
psychologists, between the persisting cognitive architecture, characterized by a relatively 
fixed set of elements with relatively stable relations among them, and a more transient set of 
causal factors that combine with that persistent architecture to produce intelligent behavior. 
In Rupert’s (2009) view, it is precisely a worked out notion of functional integration that will 
enable us to track this distinction, via the idea that a component will count as being a 
component of the cognitive architecture if and only if it meets that integration condition. 
To be clear, I am not endorsing Rupert’s specific account of integration, which is 
developed in terms of a formal measure of degrees of interdependence (Rupert 2009). For 
one thing, Rupert himself takes that notion of integration to divide up the world in such a way 
that ExC is empirically false, since all the genuinely cognitive components turn out to be 
body-side phenomena. In my view, Rupert over-emphasizes the importance of persistence 
and downplays the possibility of dynamically growing and shrinking, but nevertheless, 
transiently integrated, architectures. With that corrective, ExC is back in the picture (cf. Clark 
2011). However, that is a battle for another day. There are alternative accounts of integration 
to be explored (perhaps developed in terms of less formal “trust and glue” criteria) that do not 
obviously deliver cognitive internalist outcomes. All I want to endorse here is Rupert’s 
general deflationary approach to ownership in which that epistemically important 
phenomenon is cashed out in terms of functional integration. If this is right, then we have an 
emerging picture: functional integration (of the right sort) is necessary and sufficient for 
ownership (of the right sort), which in turn is necessary and sufficient for credit (of the right 
sort), which in turn is necessary for knowledge (in the wild). And that is a picture that I have 
argued is fully consistent with ExC. In the end, we just needed to see the world as Calvisius 
Sabinus (almost) did. 
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